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Extending the revelation effect to faces:
Haven’t we met before?
Brian H. Bornstein
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Jeffrey R. Wilson
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge

The revelation effect is an episodic memory phenomenon where participants are more likely to report that they
recognized an item when it is judged after an interpolated task than when it is not. Although this effect is very robust, nearly all of the extant research has used verbal or readily verbalizable stimuli. The present two experiments
examined whether a revelation effect could be produced with non-verbal stimuli such as faces. A revelation effect
was found in both experiments, for both targets and lures, using faces as stimuli. The findings are integrated into the
prevailing empirical frameworks for the revelation effect and face recognition memory.

lures) to a greater degree than words presented normally. Thus, the revelation effect demonstrates that
retrieval conditions can be manipulated to influence
people’s memory. Although most demonstrations of
the revelation effect have employed recognition memory tests, it has also been obtained—again using verbal stimuli—when participants are asked to make frequency judgments (Bornstein & Neely, 2001; Westerman & Greene, 1996).
The revelation effect appears to be restricted to episodic memory judgments in young adults (Cameron
& Hockley, 2000; Frigo, Reas, & LeCompte, 1999;
Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990; Westerman, 2000).
Revelation effects are not found in older adults (Prull,
Light, Collett, & Kennison, 1998) or when participants make semantic judgments, such as judging
words based on their lexicality or category typicality
(Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990), but it has otherwise
proven to be quite robust. The empirical results of the

The revelation effect is an episodic memory phenomenon that has received considerable attention in
recent years (see Hicks & Marsh, 1998, for review).
One reason for the interest in this effect is its odd nature. The revelation effect is demonstrated in retrieval
tasks—most commonly recognition memory tests—
where participants are more likely to report that they
recognized previously presented stimuli when they
engage in some interpolated task before making their
recognition judgments. For example, participants are
shown a list of words during the study phase. At test,
participants are shown both the study words (i.e., targets) and new words (i.e., lures) and asked to identify
the words they recognized from the study list. However, during the recognition phase, half of the words
are “revealed” in some fashion (e.g., by solving an
anagram of the word to be recognized or completing
a word fragment), with the result that participants report recognizing the revealed words (both targets and
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revelation effect prompted Westerman and Greene
(1998) to comment that “Attempts to determine the
boundary conditions of the revelation effect have, so
far, succeeded mostly in demonstrating its generality”
(p. 378). Thus, continuing to define the boundaries or
generality of the revelation effect is essential in terms
of theory testing.
A variety of interpolated tasks have been used to
demonstrate the revelation effect. The most common
tasks include having participants solve anagrams of
the words before making recognition judgments (e.g.,
Frigo et al., 1999; Peynircioglu & Tekcan, 1993),
gradually completing degraded words (Luo, 1993) or
word fragments (e.g., LeCompte, 1995; Watkins &
Peynircioglu, 1990), and rotating stimuli (e.g., Frigo
et al., 1999; Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990).
The revelation effect is not limited to words. Some
research has also investigated the revelation effect
with numbers. For example, participants have been
given Roman numerals and asked to convert them
to Arabic numerals before making recognition judgments about whether they saw that number on the
study list. Also, participants who received numbers
at study have had to solve math problems at test and
then decide whether their answer was on the study
list. Revelation effects were found for both of these
tasks (Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990). These findings
are not surprising, as numbers are similar to words in
the respect that they have ready, probably automatic,
verbal designations.
Only a single experiment has reported a revelation
effect with pictorial stimuli. Luo (1993, Experiment
2) presented pictures of ordinary objects and animals
to participants at study, and again on a later recognition test. For half of the participants, the name of the
picture was revealed prior to recognition by presenting it letter by letter until the word was completed.
For example, a picture of a house would be presented
at study; at test, the word H-O-U-S-E would gradually
be presented, and then participants would make a recognition judgment regarding the picture of a house.
Luo found that participants were more likely to say
they recognized the picture if the name of the picture
was first revealed to them. Although this experiment
demonstrated that a revelation effect could occur for
non-verbal study items, two points should be noted.
First, it is not clear whether a revelation effect would
have occurred if the picture itself had been revealed in

some fashion instead of the picture’s verbal label; second, the procedure required using pictures that elicited easy and universal verbal encodings, making it ambiguous to what extent the study stimuli were, in fact,
encoded non-verbally in the first place.
One area in which the revelation effect has been
largely unaddressed is recognition memory for faces.1
Based on Luo’s (1993) research, it may be inviting to
think that a revelation effect would also occur for faces. However, it is not clear whether a revelation effect
would occur in face recognition memory. Although
some research suggests that facial and pictorial recognition differ from each other in terms of perceptual processing (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998),
there has also been research to suggest that face recognition memory is comparable to picture recognition
memory, and that both face and picture recognition
memory are different from verbal memory (Church &
Winograd, 1986).
Luo’s (1993) finding of a revelation effect with pictures can be explained by assuming that pictures can
be represented in a verbal system. In fact, Farah et al.
(1998) recently concluded that face recognition and
word recognition operate in two separate representational systems, where pictures can be processed within either of the two systems. In contrast, faces are not
easily verbalized (Farah et al., 1998). Therefore, Luo
may have found a revelation effect when words were
used as the interpolated task in picture recognition because the pictures were processed verbally.
If a revelation effect occurs for faces, it demonstrates the robustness of this phenomenon across episodic tasks and stimuli (i.e., words and faces) that are
typically considered to be entirely unrelated in terms of
cognitive processing (Farah et al., 1998) and recognition memory (Church & Winograd, 1986). On the other
hand, if the revelation effect does not occur for faces,
then a specific boundary condition has been identified.
EXPERIMENT 1
Inverted words have been used to demonstrate a
revelation effect with verbal stimuli (e.g., Frigo et
al., 1999). An analogous situation for determining
whether a revelation effect can be achieved in face
recognition memory is to show faces upside down.
1

The only extant article we know of is in a Turkish journal that
we were unable to obtain (see Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2001).
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The present experiment adhered to common revelation effect methodology, with the principal exception that faces were used as the study stimuli. A 2 ×
2 (targets vs lures; revealed vs intact) within-subject
design was used. During the study phase, participants
viewed a set of faces. At test, participants saw a subset of the faces from the study list (targets) mixed
in with new faces (lures), and they made judgments
on whether they recognized the faces from the study
list. For the “intact” condition, participants saw half
of the faces (both targets and lures) presented normally and were then prompted with a command asking them if they recognized the face from the study
list. For the rest of the faces (the “revealed” condition), participants made an attractiveness judgment
about an upside-down face before it was inverted,
whereupon they were prompted to make a recognition judgment on the face. Thus, participants made
recognition judgments on both targets and lures, and
when the faces were presented intact or revealed.
Because face recognition is an episodic memory phenomenon and revelation effects have been obtained in comparable episodic tasks using verbal stimuli, we hypothesized that a revelation effect would occur for faces.
Method
Participants. The participants were 64 undergraduates from psychology courses who received extra
course credit. The pool of participants from which
the sample was drawn was predominantly white, female, and in the 18–25-year-old age range. Participants’ race and gender were included as covariates in
both experiments. As neither covariate accounted for
a significant amount of the explained variance, they
are not discussed further.
Materials. A large number of black-and-white photos of Caucasian female faces (N = 160) were collected from a high-school yearbook. The yearbook was
from a time and place that ensured the faces would
be unfamiliar to participants. These faces were transferred to slides and then pilot tested to eliminate distinctive faces, by asking participants to rate each face
on a 7-point scale (1 = not distinctive, 7 = distinctive).
Faces that received distinctiveness ratings significantly less than 4 (on the 7-point scale) were considered
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not to be distinctive. Of the original 160 faces, 140
non-distinct faces were chosen for the present series
of experiments, 100 of which were randomly selected
to be used in the first experiment.
Design and procedure. A 2 × 2 (targets vs lures; revealed vs intact) within-subject design was used. During the study phase, participants were shown 60 faces,
presented by slide projector. The first and last 10 faces
from the study list were excluded from the test phase
to reduce primacy and recency effects. Each face was
displayed for 3 seconds.
At test, participants saw 40 faces from the study list
(targets) and 40 new faces (lures). Each face was seen
for 4 seconds. Participants were asked to make (yes–
no) judgments on whether they recognized the faces
from the study list. For half of the faces (both targets
and lures), participants saw the faces presented normally and were then prompted with a command asking them if they recognized the face from the study
list. The rest of the faces were presented upside down
initially (for 2s), and then the same face was shown
normally (2s). Although the degree of effort involved
in the interpolated task does not predict the magnitude
of the revelation effect (Luo, 1993; Peynircioglu &
Tekcan, 1993), all revelation tasks require participants
to perform some sort of judgment or manipulation on
the stimulus, so that they give it some minimal level
of attention (Hicks & Marsh, 1998). To ensure attention to the interpolated task, participants were asked
to make attractiveness ratings (on a 10-point scale) for
the faces when they were presented upside down. Participants were told to wait until they saw the inverted
face normally before making a recognition judgment.
Thus, participants made recognition judgments on
both targets and lures, and when the faces were presented intact or revealed.
The faces were counterbalanced across conditions,
so that faces revealed for one set of participants were
intact for the other set of participants, and vice versa. The sequence of revealed and intact faces was determined randomly, with the constraint that an equal
number of targets and lures and revealed and intact
items occurred in the first 40 and the last 40 test trials.
Participants were tested in groups of up to 10 people.
The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes, and
when participants finished they were debriefed and
awarded their extra credit.
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Results and discussion
The revelation effect has been measured in different ways by previous researchers. Most research on
the revelation effect has compared the difference in
the number of items called “old” by participants for
the intact versus revealed conditions (e.g., Westerman
& Greene, 1998). However, signal detection measures
have also been used to examine the nature of the responses given by participants when exposed to intact items compared to revealed items (e.g., Hicks &
Marsh, 1998). For recognition memory, d’ is a measure of how well participants discriminate between
targets and lures, and C is a measure of response bias.
Signal detection measures such as d’ and C appear
to offer some value in understanding the underlying
causes of the revelation effect (Hicks & Marsh, 1998;
Luo, 1993). For the sake of completeness, the data in
the present research were analyzed both ways.
Participants were significantly more likely to respond “yes” to targets than to lures, F(1, 63) = 141.2,
p < ,001, MSe = 9.21 (see Table 1). Thus, participants
were significantly more likely to say they recognized
faces that they had seen before compared to new faces never seen.
A significant revelation effect was also found, F(1,
63) = 5.32, p < .05, MSe = 6.35 (see Table 1): Revealed faces were significantly more likely to be called
“old” than intact faces. This main effect of revelation
condition extends the revelation effect to a new class
of stimuli: faces. The revelation effect appears to be a
highly robust phenomenon that is not limited to verbal information. The target/lure × revelation interaction was not significant, F(1, 63) < 4.0, p > .05.
Signal detection analyzes revealed that d’ was not
significantly different between intact (M = .61) and
revealed items (M = .56); however, C was significant-

ly greater for intact items (M = .17) than for revealed
items (M = .06), t(63) = 2.53, p < .05. These analyzes indicate that the difference in performance between
revealed and intact items does not reflect a difference
in discriminability between the two conditions; rather,
participants applied a lower criterion for responding
“old” to revealed items.
EXPERIMENT 2
The revelation effect has also been demonstrated by
making the revealed stimulus different from the stimulus judged for recognition (Westerman & Greene,
1996). For example, a positive response bias is found
if the word raindrop is revealed and participants are
asked if they recognized vineyard. Experiment 2 replicates Experiment 1, while employing this variant of
the interpolated task. Using the same manipulation as
in Experiment 1 (i.e., stimulus inversion), Experiment
2 revealed new faces that were different from the faces that participants judged at test. Based on the results
of Experiment 1, as well as analogous procedures using verbal stimuli (Bornstein & Neely, 2001; Westerman & Greene, 1996), we hypothesized a revelation
effect for this procedure as well.
Method
Participants. The participants were 52 undergraduates from psychology courses who received extra
course credit.
Materials. The materials were identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that 40 new faces were
used in the revelation task. The 40 new faces were selected from the pool of faces that had been normed in
the pilot study for Experiment 1.
Design and procedure. The 2 × 2 design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, with the sole
exception that the revealed face was different from
the face participants were asked to make a recognition judgment about at test. Thus, the revealed faces
were completely novel to the participants. On half of
the test trials (“revelation” condition), a novel inverted face (from the new set of faces) was displayed prior to asking the participants whether they recognized
the (different) test face. As in Experiment 1, participants rated the inverted face for its attractiveness. On
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the remaining test trials, the test faces were presented
normally (“intact” condition).
It should be noted that this procedure is not precisely analogous to the raindrop–vineyard procedure used with verbal stimuli (see Bornstein & Neely,
2001; Westerman & Greene, 1996). In that situation,
participants have typically been required to solve the
interpolated anagram before judging the (different)
test item for recognition. Thus, they come to know the
identity of the interpolated item. Here, participants do
not “solve” the interpolated upside-down face before
judging the (different) face for recognition. Because
upside-down faces are processed relatively poorly, especially unfamiliar ones (Yin, 1969), participants may
not “know” an interpolated upside-down face as well
as they would an interpolated anagram, in the sense of
forming an organized percept of it. Nonetheless, the
procedure accomplishes the major goal of requiring
participants to engage in an interpolated task involving a stimulus that is different from the test stimulus,
yet drawn from the same class of stimuli.
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finding is analogous to the empirical findings of the
revelation effect for words (Westerman & Greene,
1996). The target/lure x revelation interaction was not
significant, F(1, 51) < 4.0, p > .05.
Signal detection analyzes revealed that d’ was not
significantly different between intact (M = .69) and
revealed items (M = .60); however, C was significantly greater for intact items (M = .31) than for revealed items (M = .20), t(51) = 2.71, p < .01. These
analyzes indicate that the difference in performance
between revealed and intact items does not reflect a
difference in discriminability between the two conditions, but a lower criterion for responding “old” to
revealed items.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments demonstrate that a revelation effect occurs in face recognition memory. This
finding is incorporated into the general frameworks of
research on the revelation effect and face recognition
memory, respectively.

Results and discussion
Implications for the revelation effect
Participants were significantly more likely to respond “yes” to targets than to lures, F(1, 51) = 267.54,
p < .001, MSe = 4.37 (see Table 2). Thus, participants
were significantly more likely to say they recognized
faces that they had seen previously compared to faces
never before seen.
A significant revelation effect was also found, F(1,
51) = 4.98, p < .05, MSe = 4.08 (see Table 2). Revealed faces were significantly more likely to be
called “old” than intact faces. Therefore, Experiment
2 replicated the revelation effect found in Experiment
1, and it also demonstrated that the interpolation of
different faces can produce the revelation effect. This

The revelation effect has been found with a variety
of stimuli: words, numbers, pictures of concrete objects, and now faces. Nearly all previous demonstrations of the revelation effect have used either verbal
or easily (and perhaps automatically) verbalized stimuli, such as numbers and pictures of concrete objects
(but see Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2001). The present
findings demonstrate a revelation effect with genuinely non-verbal stimuli. Of course, faces do not completely lack verbal encodings (e.g., “big nose”), but
unfamiliar faces will not have a single verbal designation that characterizes the whole stimulus, in the way
that a numeral or picture of a concrete object would
(Farah et al., 1998).
As demonstrated in previous research (Hicks &
Marsh, 1998), the revelation effect for faces was larger for lures (i.e., false alarms) than for targets (i.e.,
hits; see Tables 1 and 2). Hicks and Marsh explain the
stronger effect for lures in terms of a “decrement-tofamiliarity” interpretation of the revelation effect. According to their account, revelation produces a liberal shift in participants’ response criterion, and “more
liberal shifts in the criterion increase false-alarm rates
more than hit rates” (Hicks & Marsh, 1998, p.1118).
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The decrement-to-familiarity account is consistent
with the present results. By activating competing alternatives, revealing upside-down faces may increase
the signal-to-noise ratio and thereby make test items
seem less familiar. According to Hicks and Marsh,
this increased task difficulty would result in a more
liberal response bias, and consequently more “old” responses to revealed than to intact faces. In support of
this account, participants in both experiments adopted
a more liberal response criterion for revealed than intact items.
The present findings are also consistent with the
other leading explanation of the revelation effect,
Westerman and Greene’s (1998) Global Matching
Model, which suggests that revealing items generates trace activation for the particular class of stimuli being revealed. If the test item and revealed item
are from the same class of stimuli, this would produce
an enhanced feeling of familiarity for the revealed
test items compared to intact test items. The revelation task used here—judging an inverted face for attractiveness—could make the test stimulus seem more
familiar than it would in the intact condition, thereby supporting the Global Matching Model. One might
expect the increase in familiarity to be greater in Experiment 1 (which revealed the same face as the test
item) than in Experiment 2 (which revealed a different face), and indeed, the revelation effect was somewhat greater in Experiment 1 (4% vs 3%). However,
it is impossible to know whether this small difference
across experiments is meaningful, and given the difficulty in recognizing upside-down faces (Yin, 1969),
it might not matter whether or not the face judged for
recognition was actually the same as the face shown
as part of the interpolated task.
Although the present findings do not disambiguate
between competing theories of the revelation effect,
they nonetheless add to the accumulating literature
demonstrating that it is a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon. The revelation effect has already been found with
a wide range of interpolated tasks using primarily verbal stimuli. The present experiments demonstrated a
revelation effect for faces when the interpolated task
consisted of inverting upside-down faces. It should
also be noted that the size of the effects obtained
here was relatively modest (2–3% for targets, 4–5%
for lures), compared to previous research (on average, 6.4% for targets, 9.9% for lures; Hicks & Marsh,
1998). Revelation effects with non-verbal stimuli may
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ultimately prove to be smaller (albeit still significant)
than with verbal stimuli; but the validity of this conjecture awaits further research using non-verbal stimuli. Thus, the only real boundary conditions that exist
for the revelation effect are that it appears (1) to be a
retrieval phenomenon that is limited to episodic memory tasks based on stimulus familiarity (e.g., Cameron
& Hockley, 2000; Westerman, 2000), and (2) not to
occur in elderly participants (Prull et al., 1998).
Implications for face recognition
It is also important to consider how the present results fit into the literature on face recognition memory. Some research suggests that face recognition
memory does not differ from picture recognition
memory, while face and picture recognition memory taken together are different from verbal memory
(Church & Winograd, 1986). This dichotomy seems
at odds with Luo’s (1993) finding of a revelation effect when words were revealed prior to pictorial recognition judgments. However, Luo’s (1993) finding
of a revelation effect using words as the interpolated task in picture recognition can be explained by assuming that pictures—especially concrete ones of the
type used by Luo—can also be represented in a verbal system (Farah et al., 1998). Therefore, Luo’s revelation effect may have been produced when words
were used as the interpolated task in picture recognition because the pictures were processed verbally. In
contrast, Farah et al. (1998) summarize a long list of
research studies in support of the claim that faces are
not processed verbally. However, the finding of a revelation effect for faces when faces were used in the
interpolated task suggests that face recognition memory is not immune to some of the same retrieval phenomena that affect verbal stimuli.
There are practical implications of procedures, such
as revelation, that produce a response bias in face recognition memory. In eyewitness identification situations, for example, it is common for people to look
through pictures of criminal suspects, in the context
of mugshot searches or photographic lineups. If witnesses initially saw a face that was inverted or partially covered, and then the face was shown normally,
they might be more likely to say that they recognized
the person, compared to just seeing the intact photo.
Also, it is important to remember that the revelation
effect occurs for lures and is, in fact, slightly stronger
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for them than for targets (Hicks & Marsh, 1998; see
Tables 1 and 2). Considerable anecdotal and empirical research has documented that false positive identifications are a significant problem in eyewitness testimony (Wells et al., 1998). Therefore, it is important
to minimize conditions that may contribute to false
positive identifications, such as “revealing” the lineup stimuli.
Conclusion
The revelation effect literature has heretofore relied
almost exclusively on verbal, or easily verbalized,
stimuli. The present experiments demonstrated that a
revelation effect can be produced with faces as stimuli. This extension of the revelation effect to non-verbal stimuli suggests that it appears to hold new surprises, and to raise more questions, as it continues to
be studied.
Submitted January 2002; accepted May 2002;
published online 30 July 2003

REFERENCES
Bornstein, B.H., & Neely, C.B. (2001). The revelation effect
in frequency judgment. Memory & Cognition, 29, 209213.
Cameron, T.E., & Hockley, W.E. (2000). The revelation effect for item and associative recognition: Familiarity versus recollection. Memory & Cognition, 28, 176-183.
Church, V., & Winograd, E. (1986). Face recognition is not
unique: Evidence from individual differences. In H. Ellis,
M. Jeeves, F. Newcombe, & A. Young (Eds.), Aspects of
face processing (pp. 71-77). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Farah, M.J., Wilson, K.D., Drain, M., & Tanaka, J.N. (1998).
What is “special” about face perception? Psychological
Review, 105, 482-498.
Frigo, L.C., Reas, D.L., & LeCompte, D.C. (1999). Revelation without presentation: Counterfeit study list yields robust revelation effect. Memory & Cognition, 27, 339-343.

IN

M EMORY 12 (2004)

Hicks, J.L., & Marsh, R.L. (1998). A decrement-to-familiarity interpretation of the revelation effect from forced-choice
tests of recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24, 11051120.
LeCompte, D.L. (1995). Recollective experience in the revelation effect: Separating the contributions of revelation and
familiarity. Memory & Cognition, 23, 324-334.
Luo, C.R. (1993). Enhanced feelings of recognition: Effects
of identifying and manipulating test items on recognition
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 19, 405-413.
Peynircioglu, Z.F., & Tekcan, A.I. (1993). Revelation effect:
Effort or priming does not create the sense of familiarity.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 19, 382-388.
Prull, M.W., Light, L.L., Collett, M.E., & Kennison, R.F.
(1998). Age-related differences in memory illusions: Revelation effect. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 5,
147-165.
Tekcan, A.I., & Peynircioglu, Z.F. (2001). Revelation effect:
Effects of test conditions on face recognition. Turk Psikoloji Dergisi, 16, 57-70.
Watkins, M.J., & Peynircioglu, Z.F. (1990). The revelation effect: When disguising test items induces recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 16, 1012-1020.
Wells, G.L., Small, M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R.S., Fulero,
S.M., & Brimacombe, C.A.E. (1998). Eyewitness identification procedures: Recommendations for lineups and photospreads. Law and Human Behavior, 22, 603-647.
Westerman, D.L. (2000). Recollection-based recognition eliminates the revelation effect in memory. Memory & Cognition, 28, 167-175.
Westerman, D.L., & Greene, R.L. (1996). On the generality of
the revelation effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22, 1147-1153.
Westerman, D.L., & Greene, R.L. (1998). The revelation that
the revelation effect is not due to revelation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
24, 377-386.
Yin, R.K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 81, 141-145.

